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OPINION OF THE COURT 
                     
 
 
 
Roth, Circuit Judge: 
 In this appeal, Charles T. Hutchins, appearing pro se, 
and the Internal Revenue Service each challenge aspects of the 
entry of summary judgment below.  The district court granted 
summary judgment to the I.R.S. on its counterclaim to recoup an 
erroneous tax credit, but then, disturbed by this result, invoked 
equitable estoppel sua sponte to bar the I.R.S. from recovering 
all but a minor portion its claim.  This holding necessarily 
denied Hutchins' standing to sue for the original tax credit.  We 
reverse.  Hutchins had standing to pursue his original tax claim 
because in the bankruptcy proceedings that gave rise to this 
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case, the tax refund descended to him through abandonment as part 
of a properly scheduled antitrust action.  Because the I.R.S. 
grounded its recoupment claim solely on Hutchins' lack of 
standing, our ruling on this issue is dispositive.  We reach 
neither the validity of the underlying tax refund, which is not 
properly before us, nor the application of equitable estoppel, 
which is rendered superfluous. 
I.  Factual and Procedural History 
 In November 1979 Hutchins, as sole proprietor of 
Hutchins Supply Company, filed a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Petition in 
the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Anchorage, Alaska.  After the 
initial scheduling of all known assets and liabilities pursuant 
to 11 U.S.C. § 521(1), Hutchins learned that his business had 
failed because of his competitors' antitrust violations and 
unfair business practices.  Hutchins instituted an antitrust 
action against these competitors, amending his schedules to 
reflect the antitrust cause of action as an asset of the bankrupt 
estate.  By stipulation, the estate trustee allowed Hutchins to 
pursue the action, reserving the right to all settlement 
proceeds.  In 1986, the resulting claims were settled for 
$243,000 in cash, which was turned over to the bankruptcy 
trustee.  In addition, the antitrust defendants withdrew claims 
against the bankrupt estate for approximately $76,000 in business 
debt.  On January 27, 1987, the trustee filed an estate income 
tax return reflecting both the cash and the retired debt as 
income. 
5 
 On September 21, 1988, the trustee petitioned the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Court to abandon any remaining assets to Hutchins. The 
requisite order was issued on March 23, 1989.  The bankruptcy 
proceedings were closed sometime prior to February 1989, re-
opened on March 1, 1989, and closed a second time on March 14, 
1990. 
 On April 2, 1989, Hutchins filed an amended tax return 
for 1987, asserting that pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 108, the $76,000 
in retired business debt was not taxable income.  Hutchins sought 
a tax credit of $38,458, the amount he believed the trustee had 
overpaid by erroneously including the $76,000 in retired business 
debt as income.  On January 22, 1992, the I.R.S. granted in part 
the claimed refund and applied a credit of $37,897.04 to 
Hutchins' tax arrearages.  On September 29, 1992, Hutchins 
responded by filing a complaint against the I.R.S. in the U.S. 
District Court for the District of New Jersey seeking, among 
other relief, an additional credit of $650.  The I.R.S. responded 
by counterclaiming for the entire January 1992 tax credit, 
alleging it was granted erroneously since Hutchins was not the 
proper party to receive a refund of taxes paid by the bankruptcy 
estate. 
 On May 24, 1993, the district court dismissed Hutchins' 
various prayers for relief on several grounds, leaving the 
I.R.S.'s counterclaim as the sole remaining dispute.  That order 
has not been appealed.  On January 10, 1994, on cross motions for 
summary judgment, the district court ruled in favor of the I.R.S. 
on its counterclaim, denied Hutchins' motion to dismiss, and 
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invoked equitable estoppel to bar the I.R.S. from recovering all 
but $663 plus interest from Hutchins.  Both parties appealed to 
this court. 
II.  Jurisdiction 
 The district court properly asserted federal 
jurisdiction over the I.R.S.'s counterclaim under 26 U.S.C. 
§7405(b).  We have jurisdiction over the district court's final 
order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of a grant of 
summary judgment is plenary.  Oritani Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. 
Fidelity & Deposit Co., 989 F.2d 635, 637 (3d Cir. 1993); Goodman 
v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566, 573 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. 
denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977).  The question of standing is itself 
subject to plenary review.  Polychrome Int'l Corp. v. Krigger, 5 
F.3d 1522, 1530 n.19 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
III.  Discussion 
 In its counterclaim in district court, the I.R.S. 
sought to recoup the entire tax credit it had granted Hutchins by 
asserting that he lacked standing to pursue the discrepancy.  The 
I.R.S. argued that because Hutchins had failed to schedule the 
tax claim explicitly as an asset of the bankrupt estate, the 
right to the refund was not abandoned but was instead retained by 
the estate.  Since the refund belonged to that separately taxable 
entity, only the trustee could sue for its recovery.  Hutchins 
therefore had no basis for his claim.  Consequently, any tax 
refund granted to Hutchins was erroneous and could be recovered. 
The district court implicitly conceded this much in an elliptical 
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comment1 followed by its sua sponte application of equitable 
estoppel.  We disagree.  This line of reasoning ignores the fact 
that the tax refund originated as part of the properly scheduled 
antitrust action.  The refund claim was at best a derivative 
asset that arose as a result of the trustee's tax filings on 
behalf of the estate.  Moreover, the claim was not asserted until 
after the bankruptcy had closed.  Since it existed during the 
bankruptcy as an integral part of the antitrust claim--or if 
separately as a still inchoate right--the tax claim was properly 
scheduled through the scheduling of the antitrust action and 
descended to Hutchins through abandonment.  Hutchins had standing 
to sue. 
A. 
 We observe in passing that if the tax refund were a 
unique asset that had to be scheduled separately, as the I.R.S. 
asserts, then the failure to schedule the refund is fatal to 
Hutchins' claim.  It is clear that an asset must be properly 
scheduled in order to pass to the debtor through abandonment 
under 11 U.S.C. § 554.  See Vreugdenhill v. Navistar Int'l 
Transp. Corp., 950 F.2d 524, 526 (8th Cir. 1991) (refusing to 
find unscheduled cause of action abandoned even where trustee was 
aware of it prior to abandonment); In re Medley, 29 B.R. 84, 86-
87 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1983) (refusing to abandon unscheduled 
                                                           
1
 The opinion's only language on point read:  "The Court 
is unpersuaded by defendant's argument that the credit issued to 
plaintiff's personal account should be completely rescinded 
simply because plaintiff may have lacked standing to file the 
amended return at issue."  Hutchins v. United States, No. 92-4134 
(GEB) slip op. at 5 (D.N.J. Jan. 10, 1994) (emphasis added). 
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refund claim to debtor); DiStasio v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 
36, 52 (1990) (holding claim for refund abandoned only if 
scheduled); Weiner v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 43, 45 (1988) 
(retaining unscheduled tax refund claim as property of bankrupt 
estate); see generally 4 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 554.03 (15th ed. 
1994).  It is equally clear that since the bankrupt estate 
retains unscheduled assets, only the bankruptcy trustee has the 
authority to control them.  26 U.S.C. § 554(d) ("property . . . 
not abandoned under this section . . . remains property of the 
estate").  This authority includes the power to file an amended 
tax return.  See 26 U.S.C. § 6012(b)(4) (requiring that fiduciary 
for estate file estate return); see also Mindlin v. Drexel 
Burnham Lambert Group, 160 B.R. 508, 514 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993) 
("By operation of 11 U.S.C. § 554(c) and (d), any asset not 
scheduled pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 521(1) remains property of the 
estate, and the debtor loses all rights to enforce it under his 
own name.").  These propositions, however, beg the fundamental 
question raised by this dispute, viz. were the antitrust action 
and tax refund claim separate assets?  If they were not, then the 
tax refund was scheduled as part and parcel of the antitrust 
claim, and it descended to Hutchins through abandonment.  After 
reviewing the respective arguments, we conclude that during the 
pendency of the bankruptcy, the tax refund existed as an inherent 
part of the properly scheduled antitrust claim. 
 Initially, it bears noting that the tax refund in this 
case differs from the tax refunds that typically appear as 
unscheduled assets in bankruptcy proceedings.  The standard case 
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of an unscheduled tax refund involves an expected refund computed 
by the debtor and entered on a personal or corporate tax return, 
which the debtor then fails to schedule after declaring 
bankruptcy.  See, e.g., Mertz v. Rott, 955 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 
1992) (considering estate tax refund that debtors anticipated but 
failed to schedule); Doan v. Hudgins, 672 F.2d 831 (11th Cir. 
1982) (considering debtor's failure to list expected tax refund); 
Barowsky v. Serelson, 102 B.R. 250 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1989) 
(reopening bankruptcy after discovery of anticipated but 
unscheduled income tax refund).  The scenario is even clearer 
when the refund has already been paid by the I.R.S. and yet goes 
unscheduled.  See In re Maynard, 162 B.R. 349 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 
1993); In re Walton, 158 B.R. 943 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993).  In 
either case, the debtor knows of the existence of the asset, 
expects to receive it, and should have scheduled it. 
 The instant facts are different.  Here, the tax refund 
was the result of action by the bankruptcy trustee, and the 
claimed discrepancy was not asserted until after the bankruptcy 
had closed.  More importantly, there was no reason for the debtor 
or the trustee to assume, believe, or even guess that any refund 
existed.  The taxes were paid on income from an antitrust 
settlement, so there had been no prior withholding.  Assuming 
that the trustee computed the tax correctly, there would be no 
refund.2 
                                                           
2
 When this opinion characterizes the actions of the 
trustee as "correct", "incorrect", "erroneous" or the like, it 
does so in the abstract.  The validity of the underlying refund 
is not before us, see discussion infra, and we express no opinion 
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 These important factual distinctions indicate that at 
the time of the bankruptcy, the crucial asset, indeed the only 
asset, was the antitrust settlement.  During the bankruptcy, no 
"tax refund" asset existed.  It was at best an inchoate right. 
Creating the legal fiction that this asset arose at the time of 
the erroneous filing and existed independently, albeit covertly, 
would require every debtor to list as an additional asset a 
potential tax refund due to the possibly erroneous filings of the 
trustee.  Alternatively, the debtor would have to supervise and 
double check the actions of the trustee, contrary to the 
intention of 11 U.S.C. § 704, which makes the bankruptcy trustee 
accountable for all property received.  See In re R.E. Lee & 
Sons, Inc., 95 B.R. 316 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1989) (limiting debtor's 
burden to reasonable diligence in completing schedules).  There 
seems little to recommend either course as an innovation in 
bankruptcy procedure. 
 Neither the district court nor the parties have cited 
any authority addressing the status of an undiscovered tax refund 
that arises post-petition as a result of the filings of the 
trustee.  Our efforts have revealed no case on point.  The 
extensive citations to cases on unscheduled assets are inapposite 
if the tax refund did not yet exist.  Indeed, these cases would 
support Hutchins' claim since he properly scheduled the only 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
on the propriety of the trustee's actions.  We use these terms in 
our discussion of standing because Hutchins' original tax refund 
depended on a filing error by the trustee.  These 
characterizations have emerged as a necessary part of the case as 
framed by the parties, and the court adopts them as a 
convenience. 
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existing asset, the antitrust proceeds.  Despite the absence of 
authority, both parties offer arguments on the issue, and logic 
dictates the result. 
 First, we agree with Hutchins that "[i]t was not the 
appellant's right, position or responsibility to amend his 
schedules to reflect trustee's accounting and tax payment 
errors."  Brief of Appellant at 16.  Hutchins appears to contend 
that, as suggested above, he had no reason to suspect the error 
and hence the existence of the refund.  We make explicit the 
necessary implication:  The tax refund was not a known asset at 
the time of the bankruptcy and so could not be scheduled 
separately pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 521(1). 
 Further support flows from the concept of valuation. At 
the time of the bankruptcy, the principal asset for distribution 
to creditors was the income from the antitrust settlement.  
Creditors could reasonably assume that the estate would owe tax 
on this money, so the net value of the asset was the amount of 
the proceeds less the correct amount of tax. Alternatively, 
creditors could expect the net value to equal the amount of the 
proceeds less the amount of tax paid by the trustee plus the 
amount of any tax refund.  There is no need to take this latter 
course, which unnecessarily creates two assets from a single 
fund.  Instead, the antitrust cause of action cum tax refund can 
best be viewed as a single asset that was inadvertently 
misappraised by the bankruptcy trustee.  Assuming for the moment 
that Hutchins is correct on the merits of the tax refund, the 
trustee's failure to complete the tax return correctly 
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effectively undervalued the antitrust claim by approximately 
$37,000.  This mistake was not discovered until after 
abandonment.  It is well established in bankruptcy law that 
mistakes in valuation will not enable the trustee to recover an 
abandoned asset.  In re McGowan, 95 B.R. 104 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 
1988) (ruling that abandonment of misvalued asset is 
irrevocable); Matter of Enriquez, 22 B.R. 934 (Bankr. Neb. 1982) 
(same). 
 We find these arguments persuasive.  We are less 
impressed with the I.R.S.'s conclusory assertion that the 
antitrust cause of action was "clearly a separate asset" from the 
tax refund.  Nor are we swayed by the agency's cursory 
comparison: 
The antitrust action involved damage claims 
against various of Hutchins's competitors. 
The Government was not a party to that 
action, and no federal income tax issues were 
involved.  Here, in contrast, the Government 
is a party, the issue is one of taxation, and 
neither the competitors nor antitrust 
violations are of concern. 
Brief of Appellee at 21.  While an accurate description of the 
two causes of action as they currently stand, these distinctions 
ignore the fact that the relevant time period for scheduling is 
not the onset of subsequent litigation but rather the pendency of 
the bankruptcy.  At that point, no separate tax refund asset 
existed, or to the extent that it did, it was subsumed in the 
original declaration of the value of the antitrust proceeds. 
 Our review of these arguments indicates that the tax 
refund was properly scheduled to the extent that it could be. 
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Hutchins scheduled the only asset of which he was aware, the 
antitrust claim.  The tax refund arose later as a result of the 
actions of the trustee.  Hutchins did not cause the trustee to 
file an erroneous tax return, and he had no reason to suspect its 
existence.  Indeed, the discrepancy was not discovered until 
after the close of the bankruptcy.  We hold that Hutchins acted 
properly in scheduling his assets. 
B. 
 This resolution of the scheduling issue necessitates 
the conclusion that Hutchins had standing to sue for the tax 
refund.  Since he properly scheduled the antitrust claim, the 
right to the refund descended to him through abandonment. 
 Hutchins scheduled the antitrust claim properly.  On 
April 7, 1983, he filed in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court a Motion to 
File Amended Schedule B - Statement of All Property of Debtor. 
Page 6, line 17 of the amended Schedule B reflected "unliquidated 
antitrust claims."  This filing scheduled the antitrust claim 
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 521(1).  The tax claim was necessarily 
scheduled through this action. 
 Hutchins then received the right to this tax claim as 
an undifferentiated part of the antitrust claim he acquired 
through abandonment.  On September 21, 1988, the trustee moved 
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) for an order "that any remaining 
property scheduled by the debtor(s) be abandoned to the debtor(s) 
and that any further interest in said property be disclaimed." On 
March 23, 1989, the Bankruptcy Court entered the requisite 
Abandonment Order. 
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 Through the abandonment of the antitrust claim, 
Hutchins held the right to the potential tax refund on April 2, 
1989, when he filed the amended tax return.  As a result, he had 
standing to contest the I.R.S.'s decision regarding his refund. 
See 26 U.S.C. §§ 6402(a), 6511(a), 7422(a); 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a); 
see also Boryan v. United States, 690 F.Supp. 459, 463 (E.D. Va. 
1988). 
C. 
 Although as a general rule an affirmative holding on 
standing is merely a precursor to consideration of the merits, in 
the instant case it disposes of the controversy.  The I.R.S. 
cannot prevail as a matter of law because it took no position in 
the district court on the underlying validity of the refund.  The 
I.R.S. chose to assert only the claim that the refund was paid to 
the wrong party, and this argument depended on Hutchins' lack of 
standing.  Our contrary conclusion resolves the case.  We decline 
to consider an insufficiently explored, fact-specific, non-
dispositive theory that was not raised below. 
 On appeal, the I.R.S. attempts to argue for the first 
time that the underlying basis of Hutchins' claimed tax refund is 
incorrect because the discharge of debt by the antitrust 
defendants is not excludible income.  Brief of Appellee at 13, 
14, 28-33.  This argument was not asserted at the trial level. 
The I.R.S.'s eleventh hour Reply Brief reference to an isolated 
footnote in the record supports rather than contradicts this 
conclusion.  See Reply Brief of Appellee at 3. 
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 Under the prudential policy recognized in Hormel v. 
Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 556 (1941), we need not consider the 
I.R.S.'s new argument.  See Patterson v. Cuyler, 729 F.2d 925 (3d 
Cir. 1984); Toyota Indus. Trucks U.S.A. Inc. v. Citizen Nat'l 
Bank, 611 F.2d 465, 470 (3d Cir. 1979); see also Singleton v. 
Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976).  The reference discovered by the 
I.R.S. is remarkable only in its unobtrusiveness.  A lone and 
diminutive footnote does not constitute the assertion of a legal 
theory, especially when the same theory merited seven pages in 
the I.R.S.'s appellate brief.  See Brief of Appellee at 27-34. 
Had the issue truly been asserted at the trial level, these seven 
closely argued pages would not have been needed.  More 
importantly, it is by no means clear that the I.R.S.'s newfound 
champion can carry the day.  The argument ultimately turns on 
whether the $76,000 in claims against the bankrupt estate that 
was retired by the antitrust defendants represents "discharge of 
indebtedness" excludible under 26 U.S.C. § 108(a)(1) or instead 
taxable income for which the discharged debt is merely the 
"medium of payment."  See United States v. Centennial Savings 
Bank F.S.B., 499 U.S. 573, 582 n.7 (1991).  Further factual 
development would be required to resolve this issue and determine 
the extent of any resulting tax differential.  An appellate 
tribunal is not the proper forum for this task.  See Newark 
Morning Ledger v. United States, 539 F.2d 929, 932 (3d Cir. 
1976). 
 Put simply, the I.R.S.'s contentions regarding the 
merits of the tax refund come too late.  In the district court, 
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the I.R.S. based its counterclaim solely on standing, and only 
that issue is properly before us.  Our contrary disposition of 
this point resolves the case.   
D. 
 The district court invoked equitable estoppel sua 
sponte because its holding on standing left no bar to the 
I.R.S.'s recoupment of the tax credit, a sanction the court found 
overly severe.  We are disturbed that estoppel would be applied 
by the district court without allowing the parties to voice their 
opposition to it.  Our conclusion, however, renders this issue 
superfluous, and we need not reach it. 
 
IV.  Conclusion 
 Contrary to the holding of the district court, Hutchins 
had standing to sue as a matter of law.  Because at the trial 
level the I.R.S. based its counterclaim solely on the absence of 
standing, we will reverse and remand with instructions to enter 
summary judgment in favor of Hutchins.  In doing so, we note only 
that appellant must consider himself the fortunate beneficiary of 
the appellee's litigation strategy.  Had the I.R.S. assiduously 
pressed the validity of the tax refund at the trial level, 
Hutchins could well have lost his $37,897 bird in the hand in an 
ill-conceived grasp at $650 in the bush. 
